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The current government is aiming for cuts to administration
costs that have never previously been achieved
In their new paper, Christopher Hood and Ruth Dixon show that cutting administration
costs is difficult both for the government to do and for the public to evaluate.
The current UK coalit ion government aims to cut administrative costs in central
government by 34 per cent between 2010 and 2014. So has there ever been a period in
the recent past where comparable reductions have been achieved? Examining central
government administration costs data f rom the past three decades, we f ind there are no
reductions on anything like the scale currently planned were achieved over that t ime, even
– indeed especially – during Margaret Thatcher ’s premiership. We also f ind that despite
the recurring emphasis on ef f iciency and cost containment, government made it almost
impossible to keep track of  its perf ormance over t ime because of  instability in the way it
reported its running or administrative costs.
Looking Back to Previous Attempts to Cut Costs
With budget cuts, especially of  running costs, central to the
policy agenda of  many governments, in the UK and elsewhere,
can we learn f rom the history of  past attempts to improve
management and raise ef f iciency in the public services? Af ter
all, it  is of ten said that the managerialism associated with the
Thatcher government in the UK in the 1980s f ocused on
bureaucratic cost-cutting, and since then there have been many
ef f iciency reviews intended to cut government’s costs and
improve perf ormance by means such as better management or
IT applications.
Three Strands of Evidence : Looking at the case of  the UK,
our study examines what happened over three decades to:
Central government running or administration costs
Tax collection costs
Central government paybill costs
Exhibit  A: UK Central Government Running Costs 1980-
2009
Figure 1 shows running costs of  central government departments (excluding the Ministry of  Def ence)
net of  f ees and charges f or goods and services (e.g. issuing passports), in 2009-10 prices using the
GDP def lator.
The numbers in Figure 1 are f rom the Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA), the of f icial annual
reports of  government spending (http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pespub_index.htm). But these costs are
not presented as a single series. Instead, they appear in short runs, with f requent and sometimes major
reclassif ication changes as is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows net running costs of  civil departments as reported in successive edit ions of  PESA, in
2009-10 prices using the GDP def lator.
To construct Figure 1, we expressed the numbers in a constant series by reverting to the original basis
of  classif ication. The dotted lines in Figure 1 represent numbers that are not f ully comparable with the
earlier series because af ter the Gershon Ef f iciency Review of  2004-5 there was no overlap in the
reporting of  the f igures that would enable us to express them in the 1980s f ormat, and also,
‘Administration costs’ af ter that break meant something dif f erent f rom bef ore that t ime.
As can be seen f rom the upper (red) line in Figure 1 the net running costs increased strikingly in real
terms throughout this period apart f rom the mid-1990s and the late 2000s, and ended higher in real
terms at the end of  each Prime Minister ’s tenure than they had been at the start.
Though current policy aims are to cut absolute, not relative, administration costs, we get a dif f erent
picture if  we relate running costs to total spending, and the lower (blue) line in Figure 1 depicts what
happened to running costs (net of  f ees and charges) as a percentage of  ’Total Managed Expenditure’
(TME). That ratio remained f airly constant until the early 2000s and then f ell by about one percentage
point. However, UK public spending was increasing at an accelerating rate over this period and
approximately doubled between 1990 and 2009 in real terms. That poses a question to which there can
be no def init ive answer: is a one percentage point f all in relative administration costs during a time when
public spending doubles evidence of  good perf ormance?
Exhibit  B. Tax Collection Costs
Tax collection is central to def icit- reduction strategy, and we might also expect tax collection to be
amenable to productivity increases through better management or new IT applications. We f ound a f all in
the relative collection costs (i.e. cost to yield) since the early 1980s f or both Inland Revenue and
Customs & Excise (which merged to f orm HM Revenue & Customs in 2005). But that was driven largely
by tax revenues increasing f aster than costs. Again, if  we f ocus on costs in real terms, the subject of
current policy preoccupations, we f ound that such costs rose (albeit unsteadily) over the whole period,
ending about 50 per cent higher in 2008-09 than in 1980-81.
Exhibit  C. Civil Service Paybill Costs.
Civil service employment costs have been a central target of  cost-cutters f or many decades. But of f icial
def init ions keep changing to an extent that only caref ul detective work can produce a consistent data
series over t ime. We f ound that while Civil Service staf f  numbers f ell by about 35 % over this period, the
cost of  employing the Civil Service remained about the same in real terms, though the civil service paybill
f ell signif icantly relative to total government spending. Policy makers should theref ore not assume that
cutting civil service headcount will automatically lead to savings in paybill.
Scorecarding these Results
A way to ‘scorecard’ these results, in the light of  current policy preoccupations with absolute cost
cutting, is to give +2 f or each f all (>5%) in absolute costs; −2 f or each rise (>5%) in such costs; +1 f or
each f all in costs relative to TME/yield; and −1 f or each rise in such costs. If  we weight the three exhibits
(running costs, tax collection costs and civil service pay) equally and ignore changes of  less than 5% (as
arguably within the range of  measurement error). That would mean a top possible score of  9 and a
bottom possible score of  −9. The whole three decades considered here (1980-2009) yields the
undramatic overall score of  −1. Each of  the individual decades was similarly unimpressive, with the least
impressive perf ormance in the 1980s under Margaret Thatcher (scoring −3).
The only 5-year period that scored the maximum on every indicator (a ‘perf ect 9’) was the last 5 years of
John Major ’s premiership f rom 1992 to 1997, as shown below.
What can we draw from this analysis?
Looking back at over three decades of  managerial changes and ef f iciency drives in UK central
government, there is no clear example of  administrative cost-cutting that comes close to what current
policy-makers are aiming f or. More specif ically:
Cuts in civil service staf f  numbers do not always mean equivalent cuts in staf f ing costs
Cuts in staf f ing costs do not always mean equivalent cuts in overall running costs
Relative costs tend to f all when overall spending or tax revenue is sharply rising – leading to the
ironic conclusion (unhelpf ul f or current policy-makers) that the “best” way to cut relative costs is
to spend (or tax) more
Government and Parliament cannot practicably ascertain whether perf ormance is improving or
otherwise over t ime when the numbers keep changing in a way that makes over- time comparison
as hard and costly as possible.
Even the “perf ect 9″ scored in the late John Major period yielded less than one f if th of  the 2010
to 2014 UK administrative cost saving target of  34 per cent (though the paybill cuts came close to
the 2011-15 Scottish cost saving plan).
“A Model of  Cost Cutt ing in Government: the Great  Management Revolut ion in UK
Central Government Reconsidered“ by Christopher Hood and Ruth Dixon, is now online in
Public Administrat ion. It ’s behind a paywall but  a 4-page summary is on their project  website.
This study was f unded by the Leverhulme Trust as part of  the project “Yesterday’s Tomorrows: What
Happened to the Future of  Government?”. More details at http://xgov.polit ics.ox.ac.uk/
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